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First Amendment Envelope Pushers: Revisiting the 
Incitement-to-Violence Test with Messrs. 
Brandenburg, Trump, & Spencer 
CLAY CALVERT 
This Article examines weaknesses with the United States Supreme Court’s 
Brandenburg v. Ohio incitement test as its fiftieth anniversary approaches. 
A lawsuit targeting Donald Trump, as well as multiple cases pitting white 
nationalist Richard Spencer against public universities, provide timely 
springboards for analysis. Specifically, In re Trump: 1) illustrates 
difficulties in proving Brandenburg’s intent requirement via circumstantial 
evidence; and 2) exposes problems regarding the extent to which past 
violent responses to a person’s words satisfy Brandenburg’s likelihood 
element. Additionally, the Spencer lawsuits raise concerns about: 1) 
whether Brandenburg should serve as a prior restraint mechanism for 
blocking potential speakers from campus before they utter a single word; 
and 2) the inverse correlation between government efforts to thwart a 
heckler’s veto via heightened security measures and Brandenburg’s 
imminence requirement. Ultimately, this Article analyzes all three key 
elements of Brandenburg—intent, imminence and likelihood—as well as its 
relationship to both the heckler’s veto principle and the First Amendment 
presumption against prior restraints. 
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First Amendment Envelope Pushers: Revisiting the 
Incitement-to-Violence Test with Messrs. 
Brandenburg, Trump, & Spencer 
CLAY CALVERT * 
INTRODUCTION 
“Get ’em out of here.”1 So barked candidate Donald Trump upon 
spotting protestors at a March 2016 presidential campaign rally in 
Louisville, Kentucky.2 Among them was Kashiya Nwanguma, a twenty-
one-year-old African American.3 She hoisted a sign depicting the 
candidate’s head on a pig’s body.4  
Shortly after Trump’s declaration, Nwanguma and two other 
protestors, Molly Shah and Henry Brousseau, “were assaulted by three 
Trump supporters.”5 The protestors “allege that they were physically 
attacked by . . . Matthew Heimbach, Alvin Bamberger and an unnamed 
[individual] . . . .”6  
Heimbach, a twenty-five-year-old white nationalist, defended himself 
online. He posted that “[w]hite Americans are getting fed up[,] and they’re 
learning that they must either push back or be pushed down.”7 Conversely, 
Nwanguma claims being “roughly shoved by several white men”8 and 
                                                                                                                     
* Professor & Brechner Eminent Scholar in Mass Communication and Director of the Marion B. 
Brechner First Amendment Project at the University of Florida, Gainesville, Fla. B.A., 1987, 
Communication, Stanford University; J.D. (Order of the Coif), 1991, McGeorge School of Law, 
University of the Pacific; Ph.D., 1996, Communication, Stanford University. Member, State Bar of 
California and the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States. The author thanks Hannah Beatty, 
Elena Castello, Jessie Goodman, Mateo Haydar and Emerson Tyler of the University of Florida for 
their helpful reviews of early drafts of this article. 
1 In re Trump, 874 F.3d 948, 950 (6th Cir. 2017). 
2 Id.  
3 Ashley Parker, Riskiest Political Act of 2016? Protesting at Rallies for Donald Trump, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/11/us/politics/riskiest-political-act-of-2016-
protesting-at-rallies-for-donald-trump.html. 
4 Id. 
5 See In re Trump, 874 F.3d at 950 (explaining that the alleged assault led to the filing of a 
complaint in Kentucky). 
6 Judge to Trump: No Protection for Speech Inciting Violence, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 1, 
2017), https://www.apnews.com/6b54b2ed05a246f3a20b499aaf77edb8. 
7 Joe Heim, This White Nationalist Who Shoved a Trump Protester May be the Next David Duke, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/this-white-nationalist-who-
shoved-a-trump-protester-may-be-the-next-david-duke/2016/04/12/. 
8 Jose A. DelReal, At Trump Events, Rally and Revolt, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2016, at A1. 
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witnessing “a new side of humanity [she] hadn’t quite seen before.”9 
Nwanguma alleges Heimbach is nearly twice her size and repeatedly 
shoved her “and shouted ‘leftist scum’ at her.”10 She also asserts that 
Bamberger, a seventy-five-year-old Korean War veteran,11 later began 
“shoving her and striking her.”12 
Similarly, Molly Shah declares she “was shoved hard from behind by” 
Heimbach and, soon thereafter, “was shoved and pushed by multiple 
Trump supporters.”13 Additionally, Henry Brousseau, who was then 
seventeen, contends “he was punched in the stomach for shouting ‘Black 
Lives Matter.’”14 A video depicting the incident resides online.15 
In April 2016, Nwanguma, Shah, and Brousseau sued Trump, along 
with Heimbach and Bamberger, in Kentucky state court.16 The plaintiffs 
aver, among other things, that Trump “incited a riot”17 under Kentucky 
law.18 More specifically, they assert his speech “was calculated to incite 
violence against the Plaintiffs and others[] and does not constitute speech 
protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution . . . .”19 
Trump removed the case20 to federal court in the Bluegrass State on 
diversity jurisdiction21 grounds.22  
                                                                                                                     
9 Heim, supra note 7. 
10 Verified Complaint at 8, Nwanguma v. Trump, No. 16C101504 (Jefferson Cnty. Cir. Ct. Ky. 
Mar. 31, 2016) [hereinafter Nwanguma Verified Complaint], 
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PR-KY-0001-0001.pdf. 
11 DelReal, supra note 8.  
12 Nwanguma Verified Complaint, supra note 10, at 8.  
13 Id. at 9. 
14 Phillip M. Bailey et al., Police Report Filed in Trump Rally Altercation, COURIER-J. (Mar. 2, 
2016), https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/politics/elections/kentucky/2016/03/02/charges-
filed-altercation-trump-rally/81233794/.  
15 Young Black Woman Pushed by Attendees at Trump Rally, GUARDIAN (Mar. 2, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/video/2016/mar/02/black-woman-shoved-donald-trump-rally-
video.  
16 Nwanguma Verified Complaint, supra note 10. 
17 See id. at 15 (arguing that Trump’s actions at the rally violated KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
525.010, 525.040 (West 2017)). 
18 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 525.010(5) (West 2017) (defining a riot as “a public disturbance 
involving an assemblage of five (5) or more persons which by tumultuous and violent conduct creates 
grave danger of damage or injury to property or persons or substantially obstructs law enforcement or 
other government function”); id. at § 525.040(1) (West 2017) (“A person is guilty of inciting to riot 
when he incites or urges five (5) or more persons to create or engage in a riot.”). Professor Margot 
Kaminski points out that Kentucky’s riot statute includes “no mention of imminence, likelihood, or 
intent”—the three key elements of the United States Supreme Court standard for incitement fashioned 
in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). See Margot E. Kaminski, Incitement to Riot in the Age 
of Flash Mobs, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 29 (2012). 
19 Nwanguma Verified Complaint, supra note 10, at 15. 
20 See Debra Lyn Bassett & Rex R. Perschbacher, The Roots of Removal, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 6 
(2011) (describing the history of the process of removal of state cases to federal court and noting that 
“Removal is a popular procedure, transferring approximately thirty thousand cases annually out of state 
courts and into federal courts.”). 
21 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (noting that federal judicial power extends to controversies 
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The lawsuit pivots on whether Trump’s words caused the assaults, and 
in turn, whether the First Amendment23 safeguards the President’s speech. 
The latter facet is critical because messages that are both directed to and 
likely to incite imminent violence are not protected24 by the First 
Amendment.  
Incitement is unprotected because of “its similarity to action,”25 and as 
“speech increases the likelihood of imminent violent action, it becomes 
analogous to an action . . . .”26 Indeed, Professor Jed Rubenfeld asserts that 
“[w]hen someone intentionally uses speech to bring about imminent 
unlawful conduct, and it is likely that this result will ensue, he is properly 
treated as having engaged himself in, as having participated in, that course 
of conduct.”27 Incitement thus blurs, if not obliterates, “the fundamental 
distinction between speech and conduct.”28 
In particular, the United States Supreme Court held in 1969 in 
                                                                                                                     
“between Citizens of different States”); 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a)(1) (2012) (providing that federal district 
courts shall have original diversity jurisdiction over “civil actions where the matter in controversy 
exceeds the sum or value of $75,000” and where the case involves “citizens of different States”). As 
one article summarizes it, diversity jurisdiction “generally permits civil litigants having different 
citizenships to have their disputes adjudicated in federal court so long as the claims are big enough—
even in the absence of any federal cause of action. This form of subject matter jurisdiction has been 
around since the first Judiciary Act of 1789 and has seen its popularity, among federal judges and other 
members of the legal profession, wax and wane over the last two centuries.” James M. Underwood, The 
Late, Great Diversity Jurisdiction, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 179–80 (2006). 
22 Joint Notice of Removal, Nwaguma v. Trump, No. 3:16-cv-00247-DJH-HBB, *2 (W.D. Ky. 
Apr. 29, 2016).  
23 The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free 
Press Clauses were incorporated more than ninety years ago as fundamental liberties applying to state 
and local government through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. See Gitlow v. New 
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (noting that the fundamental liberties created by the First Amendment 
are “free from impairment by the States”). 
24 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that several categories of expression are unprotected by the 
First Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (noting that “advocacy 
intended, and likely, to incite imminent lawless action” is among the few categories of “content-based 
restrictions on speech [that] have been permitted”); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245–
46 (2002) (“The freedom of speech has its limits; it does not embrace certain categories of speech, 
including defamation, incitement, obscenity, and pornography produced with real children.” (emphasis 
added)). 
25 Scott Hammack, The Internet Loophole: Why Threatening Speech On-line Requires a 
Modification of the Courts’ Approach to True Threats and Incitement, 36 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 65, 77 (2002). 
26 Id. 
27 Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 828 (2001).  
28 Martin H. Redish, Fear, Loathing, and the First Amendment: Optimistic Skepticism and the 
Theory of Free Expression, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 691, 700 (2015); see also Randall P. Bezanson, Is There 
Such a Thing as Too Much Free Speech?, 91 OR. L. REV. 601, 601 (2012) (“From its beginning, the 
First Amendment speech guarantee has rested on two fundamental boundaries: speech versus conduct 
and liberty versus utility” (emphasis added)).  
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Brandenburg v. Ohio29 “that the constitutional guarantees of free speech 
and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the 
use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to 
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or 
produce such action.”30 This test is the latest iteration of the nearly century-
old clear and present danger standard31 articulated in Schenck v. United 
States.32 It is, in fact, “an even stronger version of the original clear and 
present danger test.”33 
The Brandenburg test, as Dean Rodney Smolla summarizes it, has 
three key elements: “(1) intent (embodied in the requirement that such 
speech be ‘directed to inciting or producing’ lawless action); (2) 
imminence (embodied in the phrase ‘imminent lawless action’); and (3) 
likelihood (embodied in the phrase ‘and is likely to incite or produce such 
action’).”34 Professor Mark Strasser dubs this “a robust standard by which 
to protect expression.”35 Indeed, Professor Susan Gilles observes that 
“Brandenburg is a celebrated case, first and foremost, because of its 
startling commitment to free speech.”36 Today, it stands as “one of the 
most well-established aspects of modern constitutional doctrine.”37 
Are Trump’s words unsheltered by the First Amendment per 
Brandenburg? In March 2017, U.S. District Judge David Hale deemed it 
“plausible that Trump’s direction to ‘get ’em out of here’ advocated the use 
of force.”38 Importantly, Judge Hale reasoned that the phrase “‘get ’em out 
of here’ is stated in the imperative; it was an order, an instruction, a 
command.”39 Also noting the plaintiffs’ assertion that “the violence began 
                                                                                                                     
29 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).  
30 Id.  
31 See Susan M. Gilles, Brandenburg v. State of Ohio: An “Accidental,” “Too Easy,” and 
“Incomplete” Landmark Case, 38 CAP. U. L. REV. 517, 520 (2010) (“Brandenburg is famous for 
abandoning the ‘clear and present danger’ test.”); Steven M. Morrison, The System of Modern Criminal 
Conspiracy, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 371, 389 (2014) (“The ‘clear and present danger’ test gradually 
evolved into the Brandenburg test, which the Court set forth in the 1969 case of the same name . . . .”). 
32 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such 
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about 
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.”). 
33 Michael J. Mannheimer, The Fighting Words Doctrine, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1533 
(1993). 
34 Rodney A. Smolla, Should the Brandenburg v. Ohio Incitement Test Apply in Media Violence 
Tort Cases? 27 N. KY. L. REV. 1, 10 (2000) (emphasis added) (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 
U.S. 444, 447 (1969)). 
35 Mark Strasser, Mill, Holmes, Brandeis, and a True Threat to Brandenburg, 26 BYU J. PUB. L. 
37, 56 (2011). 
36 Gilles, supra note 31, at 520. 
37 Steven G. Gey, The Brandenburg Paradigm and Other First Amendments, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 971, 977 (2010). 
38 Nwanguma v. Trump, 273 F. Supp. 3d 719, 727 (W.D. Ky. 2017), rev’d and remanded, 903 
F.3d 604 (6th Cir. 2018).  
39 Id.  
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as soon as Trump said ‘get ’em out of here,”40 Judge Hale concluded that 
Nwanguma, Shah, and Brousseau “alleged a plausible claim of incitement 
to riot.”41 He therefore refused to dismiss the case. 
This, however, did not end the matter. In August 2017, Judge Hale 
acknowledged the crucial nature of the Brandenburg issue in In re Trump, 
emphasizing “that Trump’s statement, on its face, does not explicitly call 
for violence.”42 He thus certified for immediate appeal43 to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit the following question: “Does 
the First Amendment protect Donald J. Trump’s March 1, 2016 statement 
‘Get ’em out of here,’ or may the statement be found to constitute 
incitement of a riot?”44 
Resolving this query is exceedingly difficult, affording ample 
analytical fodder for this Article. Along with the raft of public 
universities45 denying access to “high-profile white nationalist”46 and alt-
right leader Richard Spencer47 because his words ostensibly could incite 
violence,48 In re Trump provides a propitious opportunity to explore 
                                                                                                                     
40 Id. at 728. 
41 Id. 
42 Nwanguma v. Trump, No. 3:16-cv-247-DJH-HBB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126039, at *10 
(W.D. Ky. Aug. 9, 2017) (order granting motion to certify for interlocutory appeal or to reconsider).  
43 See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2012) (providing that a district judge may certify in writing a question 
to an appellate court if he or she believes there is “a controlling question of law as to which there is 
substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal . . . may materially advance 
the ultimate termination of the litigation”). 
44 Nwanguma, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126039, at *13. 
45 See Susan Svrluga, University of Michigan Considers Renting Space to White Nationalist 
Speaker, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 2017, at A7 (noting that “lawsuits were filed against Michigan State, 
Penn State, and Ohio State universities, seeking to force them to allow” Spencer to speak). 
46 Trevor Hughes, Decades of Pent-up Anger Feed White Nationalist Crusade, USA TODAY, 
Dec. 18, 2017, at 1A. 
47 Spencer is “a prominent white nationalist.” Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Brian M. Rosenthal, White 
Nationalist Protest Leads to Deadly Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2017, at A1. He has also been 
described as “the most recognizable alt-right voice in America.” Carlos Lozada, How Racist Trolls Will 
Upend America, With or Without Trump, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2017, at B1. 
48 See generally Complaint, Padgett v. Auburn Univ., No. 3:17-cv-00231-WKW (M.D. Ala. Apr. 
18, 2017) [hereinafter Auburn Complaint], available at http://www.courthousenews.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/04/Controversial-speaker-lawsuit.pdf; Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint, Padgett v. 
Bd. of Trs. Mich. State Univ., No. 1:17-cv-00805 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 3, 2017) [hereinafter Michigan 
State Complaint], available at http://dailycaller.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Padgett-v-Michigan-
State.pdf; Padgett v. Bd. of Trs. Ohio State Univ., No. 2:17-cv-00919-ALM-KAJ (S.D. Ohio Oct. 22, 
2017) [hereinafter Ohio State Complaint], available at http://www.courthousenews.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/10/SpencerOSU.pdf; Padgett v. Bd. of Trs. Pa. State Univ., No. 4:2017cv01911 
(M.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 2017) [hereinafter Penn State Complaint], available at 
http://www.almcms.com/contrib/content/uploads/documents/402/4903/Richard-Spencer-PSU.pdf. In 
January 2018, Michigan State University relented, settling the lawsuit and agreeing to allow Richard 
Spencer to speak on campus in March 2018, while nonetheless distancing itself from his views. Susan 
Svrluga, Michigan State Agrees to Let Richard Spencer Give a Speech on Campus, WASH. POST (Jan. 
18, 2018), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2018/01/18/michigan-state-agrees-to-
let-richard-spencer-give-a-speech-on-campus/?utm_term=.06d9338b681a. Kyle Bristow, the attorney 
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weaknesses with the Brandenburg test as it rapidly approaches its golden 
anniversary.  
Importantly, this Article focuses only on in-person incitement 
scenarios, where the speaker and audience are in close physical proximity. 
This sweeps up both Trump’s campaign rallies and Spencer’s talks at 
public universities. In contrast, much scholarly ink already has been spilled 
on the multiple problems with applying Brandenburg to high-tech, 
mediated messages such as emails, texts, and posts on social media.49 
Those scenarios fall beyond the scope of this Article. 
Several items complicate In re Trump. For instance, defendant Alvin 
Bamberger—one of the individuals who attacked Nwanguma—claims he 
“would not have acted as he did without Trump and/or the Trump 
campaign’s specific urging and inspiration.”50 Bamberger’s attorney 
contends his client simply acted “in response to—and [was] inspired by—
Trump and/or the Trump campaign’s urging to remove the protesters.”51 
Similarly, Matthew Heimbach asserts he “acted pursuant to the requests 
and directives” of Trump.52 As Heimbach bluntly avows, Trump “knew 
what he was asking for.”53 In brief, Bamberger and Heimbach both 
maintain they acted in response to Trump’s words. This suggests—at least 
in part—that those words are not safeguarded under Brandenburg. 
On the other hand, shortly after Trump uttered “Get ’em out of here,”54  
he added a dose of message-softening language. Specifically, Trump said, 
                                                                                                                     
who filed the lawsuit against Michigan State University on behalf of Spencer, called the settlement “a 
resounding First Amendment victory for the alt-right” and added that “left-wing censorship of right-
wing ideas in academia is unacceptable.” David Jesse, White Supremacist Richard Spencer Will Speak 
at Michigan State After All, DET. FREE PRESS (Jan. 18, 2018), 
http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2018/01/18/richard-spencer-michigan-state-
university/1044354001/. 
49 See, e.g., Alan K. Chen, Free Speech and the Confluence of National Security and Internet 
Exceptionalism, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 379, 391–97 (2017); John P. Cronan, The Next Challenge for 
the First Amendment: The Framework for an Internet Incitement Standard, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 425 
(2002); Daniel T. Kobil, Advocacy on Line: Brandenburg v. Ohioand Speech in the Internet Era, 31 
U. TOL. L. REV. 227 (2000); Chris Montgomery, Note, Can Brandenburg v. Ohio Survive the Internet 
and the Age of Terrorism?: The Secret Weakening of a Venerable Doctrine, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 141 
(2009); Russell L. Weaver, Brandenburg and Incitement in aDigital Era, 80 MISS. L.J. 1263 (2011).  
50 Clarence Page, Is Trump to Blame for the Violence at His Rallies?, DAYTON DAILY NEWS 
(Ohio), Apr. 19, 2017, at A9.  
51 Jonathan Turley, How Louisville Could Decide Trump Immunity, USA TODAY, Apr. 24, 2016, 
at 7A. 
52 Attachment to Form Answer of Defendant Matthew Warren Heimbach to Complaint of 
Plaintiffs Kashtya Nwanguma, Molly Shah and Henry Brousseau at 22, Nwanguma v. Trump, No. 
3:16-cv-00247-DJH-HBB (W.D. Ky. Apr. 17, 2016), available at 
http://www.politico.com/f/?id=0000015b-7dcc-db04-ad5b-7ded76a30002. 
53 David Zucchino, A Trump Campaign Rally Led to Shoving, and Legal Wrangling, Too, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 28, 2017, at A16. 
54 In re Trump, 874 F.3d 948, 950 (6th Cir. 2017). 
 2019] FIRST AMENDMENT ENVELOPE PUSHERS 125 
“[D]on’t hurt ’em—if I say ‘go get ’em,’ I get in trouble with the press.”55 
Such a cautionary, backpedaling admonition seems to militate against 
finding incitement. 
 Additionally, one might wonder whether Trump’s initial declaration 
was really a call for violence or just Trump being Trump—pompously 
posturing and pandering. The line between unlawful incitement and 
permissible showmanship—between a plea for physical action and a 
figurative chumming of political waters—is unclear.  
To wit, a March 2016 Washington Post article observed that 
“Trump often says that he loves having protesters at his rallies, that they 
make his rallies fun. Plus, the interruptions are an opportunity to show him 
bossing around and mocking liberals, often bellowing, ‘Get ’em out!’”56 
Or, as a New York Times story put it, “Trump tries to turn the interruptions 
to his advantage, showcasing his large crowds and commanding presence, 
alternately shouting ‘Get ’em out of here’ and ‘Be nice.’”57 Trump argues 
“his demands were only intended for security guards.”58 In the petition for 
a writ of mandamus,59 the President’s attorneys contend his speech is fully 
protected by the First Amendment.60 They assert, among other things, that: 
•   “[T]he challenged speech was an exercise of Mr. Trump’s clear 
First Amendment right to exclude disruptive protestors from his 
campaign rally.”61  
•   “[P]olitical campaigns and candidates have a core First Amendment 
right to associate for the purpose of expressing their political 
message, which necessarily entails the right to ‘exclu[de]’ 
disruptive protestors who seek to express ‘views [that] [a]re at 
odds with positions [the campaign] espouse[s].’”62 
•  “Mr. Trump and the Campaign had every right to call for the 
removal of the protestors from the event. Any contrary rule would 
                                                                                                                     
55 Id.  
56 Karen Tumulty et al., Vitriol Follows Trump on Campaign Trail, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2016, 
at A1. 
57 Parker, supra note 3, at A1. 
58 Jason Silverstein, Trump Turned Me into Brawlin’ Goon, DAILY NEWS, Apr. 17, 2017, at 
News 7. 
59 See 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2012) (“The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of 
Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and 
agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”); Amy E. Sloan, Appellate Fruit Salad and Other 
Concepts: A Short Course in Appellate Process, 35 U. BALT. L. REV. 43, 57 (2005) (“A petition for a 
writ of mandamus or prohibition is a request separate from the underlying case that is filed as an 
original matter with the appellate court.”).  
60 Petition for Writ of Mandamus, In re Trump, No. 17-5830, 2017 WL 3130326 (6th Cir. July 20, 
2017), at *1 [hereinafter Petition for Mandamus].  
61 Id. at *2. 
62 Id. at *10–11 (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 
557, 580 (1995)). 
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destroy the practical ability of political campaigns to express their 
own messages at campaign rallies without being sabotaged by 
hostile protestors.”63  
•  “Since ‘Get them out of here’ is an entirely natural and proper 
expression of lawful means to protect the Campaign’s undiluted 
message and association, it cannot be penalized under the First 
Amendment (particularly when accompanied by the ‘Don’t hurt 
’em’ admonition).”64 
•  “Mr. Trump’s speech is protected under Brandenburg because it 
was devoid of any advocacy of violence. In calling for the removal 
of disruptive protestors by saying ‘Get ’em out of here,’ he did not 
say a single word about unlawful force or violence. To the 
contrary, he affirmatively discouraged violence by telling the 
audience, ‘Don’t hurt ’em.’”65  
•  “Mr. Trump’s call for the removal of protestors was fully protected 
unless he advocated a greater degree of force than necessary to 
remove them. Absent that type of unlawful advocacy, he cannot be 
liable for incitement.”66  
Solid, logical arguments thus exist on both sides as to whether 
Trump’s speech falls outside the bounds of First Amendment refuge. Put 
bluntly: reciting Brandenburg’s elements67 is simple, but applying them is 
complicated. 
To further examine the Brandenburg quagmire, Part I lays the 
foundation for later Sections by providing primers on three subjects: (1) 
the current incitement standard; (2) the heckler’s veto principle; and (3) the 
presumption against prior restraints on expression.68 Next, Part II drills 
deeper into In re Trump, focusing on the challenges the case exposes for 
satisfying two facets of Brandenburg—intent and likelihood.69 Part III then 
shifts attention to multiple lawsuits filed in 2017 against public universities 
that denied Richard Spencer campus access because his words allegedly 
are likely, per Brandenburg, to incite imminent lawless action.70 The 
Spencer lawsuits, Part III reveals, illustrate Brandenburg’s complex 
relationship with First Amendment doctrines regarding both prior restraints 
and the heckler’s veto. Finally, Part IV concludes by calling on the 
Supreme Court to clarify the meaning and application of Brandenburg’s 
                                                                                                                     
63 Id. at *12.  
64 Id. at *13. 
65 Id. at *14. 
66 Id. at *22. 
67 See supra note 34 and accompanying text (setting forth the three key elements of the 
Brandenburg test). 
68 See infra Part I. 
69 See infra Part II. 
70 See infra Part III. 
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elements and its relationship to the prior restraint and heckler’s veto 
doctrine as the case nears its fiftieth anniversary.71 
I. PRIMERS ON KEY CONCEPTS: INCITEMENT TO VIOLENCE, THE 
HECKLER’S VETO, AND PRIOR RESTRAINTS ON EXPRESSION 
This Part has three Sections. Section A provides detailed background 
on the Brandenburg test, while Section B addresses the heckler’s veto 
principle. Finally, Section C briefly reviews the general presumption 
against the constitutionality of prior restraints on expression.  
A. The Brandenburg Test for Incitement to Violence 
As noted above,72 in 1969, the Supreme Court held in Brandenburg v. 
Ohio that the “constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do 
not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of 
law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such 
action.”73 In its per curiam opinion, the Court struck down a criminal 
syndicalism statute because it punished “mere advocacy”74 and failed to 
distinguish it “from incitement to imminent lawless action.”75 The Court 
reiterated this point in 1982, observing that “mere advocacy of the use of 
force or violence does not remove speech from the protection of the First 
Amendment.”76 
Indeed, Brandenburg draws a crucial dichotomy between “the mere 
abstract teaching . . . of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a 
resort to force and violence”77 on the one hand, and speech that is essential 
for “preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action”78 on 
the other.79 Furthermore, Brandenburg renders “irrelevant whether or not 
the speech offends; all that matters is the likelihood that the harm of 
imminent lawlessness will result.”80 In a nutshell, Brandenburg serves up 
                                                                                                                     
71 See infra Part IV. 
72 Supra note 29–30 and accompanying text. 
73 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
74 Id. at 449. 
75 Id.  
76 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927 (1982) (emphasis added). 
77 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447–48 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297–98 
(1961)). 
78 Id.  
79 See O. Lee Reed, The State is Strong but I Am Weak: Why the “Imminent Lawless Action” 
Standard Should Not Apply to Targeted Speech That Threatens Individuals With Violence, 38 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 177, 190 (2000) (“[In] Brandenburg v. Ohio[,] . . . mere abstract advocacy of violence was 
insufficient to permit the government to limit otherwise free speech.”). 
80 John T. Nockleby, Hate Speech in Context: The Case of Verbal Threats, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 
653, 669 (1994). 
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“a very speech-protective way of drawing the definitional line between 
advocacy of illegal action that is encompassed within the First Amendment 
and such speech that is not.”81  
The case centered on a speech by Ku Klux Klan leader Clarence 
Brandenburg that accompanied a cross burning attended by approximately 
a dozen Klan members, “some of whom carried firearms.”82 Other than one 
television journalist and a cameraman, no one else was present on the 
Hamilton County, Ohio farm.83 At this gathering, the Klansman hurled 
insults about African-Americans and Jews.84 He also informed his hooded 
colleagues that “[w]e’re not a revengent [sic] organization, but if our 
President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the 
white, Caucasian race, it’s possible that there might have to be some 
revengeance [sic] taken.”85 
Because no one else was nearby to hear such vitriol—only a dozen 
Klansmen, a reporter, and a cameraman—it appears evident these 
admonitions were not likely to produce the brand of imminent lawless 
action the Brandenburg test requires. Furthermore, Clarence Brandenburg 
qualified his messages in conditional terms rather than expressing them as 
immediate directives. In particular, “revengeance” was only “possible” and 
simply “might” be needed “if” government officials continued to suppress 
whites.86  
The rambling speech ultimately was protected, as Professor Alexander 
Tsesis observes, because it consisted merely of “abstract statements voiced 
only in the presence of like-minded individuals and invited guests.”87 
Tsesis points out, as noted above, that “the only people present at the rally 
were Ku Klux Klan members and a camera crew, whom the Klan 
invited.”88 
Under Brandenburg, as Professor James Wilson explains, “a 
prosecutor must prove . . . (1) advocacy, (2) of the use of force or of law 
violation, (3) the intention to incite or produce unlawful action, (4) the 
imminence of the unlawful act, and (5) the likelihood that such action will 
be produced.”89 Wilson maintains that “prosecutors will have the easiest 
                                                                                                                     
81 Norman T. Deutsch, Professor Nimmer Meets Professor Schauer (and Others): An Analysis of 
“Definitional Balancing” as a Methodology for Determining the “Visible Boundaries of the First 
Amendment”, 39 AKRON L. REV. 483, 507 (2006). 
82 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 445. 
83 Id.  
84 See id. at 446 n.1 (providing examples of Brandenburg’s repeated use of racial slurs).  
85 Id. at 446.  
86 Id. (emphasis added). 
87 Alexander Tsesis, Inflammatory Speech: Offense Versus Incitement, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1145, 
1159 (2013). 
88 Alexander Tsesis, Terrorist Speech on Social Media, 70 VAND. L. REV. 651, 667 (2017). 
89 James G. Wilson, Surveying the Forms of Doctrine on the Bright Line-Balancing Test 
Continuum, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773, 804 (1995). 
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time proving advocacy of the use of force or law violation, more difficulty 
with mens rea, and either an easier or harder time proving imminence and 
likelihood, depending on whether or not force or lawlessness eventually 
occurred.”90 Mens rea is “the Latin phrase for a guilty mind.”91   
In other words, the rubber meets the road with the same three factors 
described earlier—intent (mens rea), imminence, and likelihood.92 
Professors Julie Seaman & David Sloan Wilson concur that the 
Brandenburg test “encompass[es] the three elements of (1) intent; (2) 
imminence; and (3) likelihood.”93 These three components of 
Brandenburg94 are part of what Professor Christina Wells calls a 
“weighted”95 balancing approach “requiring the Court to weigh 
the likelihood and magnitude of harm against the right to free 
expression.”96 The test is weighted because, in balancing harm against free 
speech, it “heavily favors speech in the absence of concrete evidence of 
intentional and likely imminent harm.”97  
Professor Jed Rubenfeld, however, disagrees with Wells’s assertion 
that “magnitude of harm”98 is important under Brandenburg.99 As 
Rubenfeld views it, magnitude of harm is “a factor with which 
Brandenburg does not concern itself. As far as Brandenburg is concerned, 
a person who deliberately incites others to commit a minor offense is in the 
same position as a person who incites others to riot. In both cases, the 
speech is equally unprotected.”100  
Rubenfeld, in fact, rejects Wells’ contention that Brandenburg 
involves a balancing approach.101 Instead, he contends it is better 
considered “as a test to determine whether an individual has intentionally 
used speech so closely and directly engaged with a particularized course of 
prohibited conduct that the individual may be treated as having participated 
                                                                                                                     
90 Id.  
91 John Villasenor, Technology and the Role of Intent in Constitutionally Protected Expression, 39 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 631, 642 (2016). 
92 Smolla, supra note 34. 
93 Julie Seaman & David Sloan Wilson, #FreeSpeech, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1013, 1028, n.83 (2016). 
94 See Hannah Steinblatt, E-Incitement: A Framework for Regulating the Incitement of Criminal 
Flash Mobs, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 753, 770 (2012) 
(“The Brandenburg test is comprised of three distinct elements: intent, imminence, and likelihood.”). 
95 Christina E. Wells, Bringing Structure to the Law of Injunctions Against Expression, 51 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 1, 48 (2000). 
96 Id. at 47. 
97 Id. at 48. 
98 Id. at 47. 
 99 See Rubenfeld, supra note 27, at 829 (explaining how Brandenberg perceives the magnitude 
of harm). 
100 Id. (emphasis added). 
101 See id. (“Despite appearances, the Brandenburg test cannot be understood as a balancing 
test.”). 
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in that conduct.”102 
With this overview in mind, what do the three key elements of 
Brandenburg mean? The following subsections separately examine each 
one. 
1. Intent 
In Hess v. Indiana,103 the Court clarified that Brandenburg’s “directed 
to” facet means that a speaker’s words must be “intended to produce”104 
unlawful action.105 Furthermore, Hess suggested that intent can be 
determined by a “rational inference from the import of the language.”106  
Put differently, the Brandenburg standard features a “mens rea 
requirement that the speaker had the purpose to produce . . . harm.”107 
Including a mens rea or state-of-mind component marked a significant 
development in the evolution of the incitement doctrine because, as Erwin 
Chemerinsky writes, “[n]one of the earlier tests had contained an intent 
requirement.”108  
An intent requirement is vital for protecting free expression because, 
without it, incitement would be a strict liability crime.109 Strict liability 
offensives, in turn, harm First Amendment interests because they chill 
speech.110 The danger of self-censorship stemming from strict liability, of 
course, was also a primary reason the Supreme Court adopted the actual 
malice standard in defamation law in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.111 
                                                                                                                     
102 Id.  
103 414 U.S. 105 (1973).  
104 Id. at 108–09. 
105 See Eugene Volokh, The Freedom of Speech and Bad Purposes, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1366, 
1370 (2016) (“Hess v. Indiana held that ‘directed to’ here means intended to persuade people to act 
illegally.”). 
106 Hess, 414 U.S. at 109. 
107 Volokh, supra note 105, at 1383. 
108 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1375 (5th ed. 
2017). 
109 Leslie Kendrick, Free Speech and Guilty Minds, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1255, 1281 (2014) 
(“Strict liability penalizes a speaker for an unintended aspect of her message and disregards her actual 
communicative projects. It reaches speakers who do not intend harm and who are reasonably unaware 
of the harmful aspects of their speech.”). 
110 Id. at 1277 (“The chilling effect is a free-speech principle that could explain why strict liability 
is inappropriate without making speaker’s intent intrinsic to speech protection. Speakers who face strict 
liability will stay silent when uncertain of the accuracy of their information.”); see also Jonathon W. 
Penney, Chilling Effects: Online Surveillance and Wikipedia Use, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117, 125 
(2016) (“The idea that government laws or actions might chill people’s free activities gained its most 
prominent early expression in the United States during the Cold War. The ‘chilling effects doctrine,’ a 
legal doctrine in First Amendment jurisprudence, took shape in a series of cases decided in the 1950s 
and 60s that dealt with anti-communist state measures. Essentially, the doctrine encouraged courts to 
treat rules or government actions that ‘might deter’ the free exercise of First Amendment rights ‘with 
suspicion.’”). 
111 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Court in Sullivan held that Alabama’s strict liability provision in its 
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As Professor Frederick Schauer observed, the chilling effect doctrine 
played a “critical role”112 in Sullivan. Including an intent component in 
Brandenburg thus shields and safeguards what Professor Susan Gilles 
aptly dubs “the ‘accidental’ inciter—the speaker whose language triggers a 
riot, but who had no intent to incite such lawlessness.”113 Additionally, the 
intent element separates provocative speech (protected) from incitement 
(unprotected).114 
 Proving a speaker’s intent, as this Article’s discussion of In re Trump 
later demonstrates,115 is far from easy. Professor Eugene Volokh, for 
example, points out that: 
[A]ny conclusion about the speaker’s purpose will usually 
just be a guess. There will often be several plausible 
explanations for just what the speaker wanted—to push an 
ideology, to convey useful information, to sell more books, to 
titillate readers by being on the edge of what is permitted, 
and more.116  
In contrast to Brandenburg, the Court’s test for another unprotected 
                                                                                                                     
libel regime was “constitutionally deficient for failure to provide the safeguards for freedom of speech 
and of the press that are required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments in a libel action brought by a 
public official against critics of his official conduct.” Id. at 264. The Court reasoned that “[a] rule 
compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions—and to do so 
on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount—leads to a comparable ‘self-censorship.’” Id. 
at 279. To rectify this situation, the Court adopted a fault standard—actual malice—that focuses on the 
subjective state of mind of the defendant at the time of publication about the veracity of the statements 
at issue. Id. at 279–80. See also Matthew D. Bunker, Constitutional Baselines: First Amendment 
Theory, State Action and the “New Realism,” 5 COMM. L. & POL’Y 1, 22 (2000) (“In Sullivan, there is 
a direct relation between the legal rule (strict liability in defamation) and the inhibition of important 
political speech about government officials.”); David F. Partlett & Russell L. Weaver, Remedies, 
Neutral Rules and Free Speech, 39 AKRON L. REV. 1183, 1189 (2006) (“In Sullivan, the Court was 
concerned about the chilling effect of defamation judgments on reporting.”); Stephen A. Siegel, 
Injunctions for Defamation, Juries, and the Clarifying Lens of 1868, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 655, 656 
(2008) (“Before New York Times v. Sullivan, defamation was a strict liability tort.” (citation omitted)); 
Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy 
Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 315 (1983) (“The Court ruled that a strict liability libel standard is 
unconstitutional.”). 
112 Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling Effect,” 58 
B.U. L. REV. 685, 705 (1978). 
113 Gilles, supra note 31, at 523. 
114 Daniel Ortner, The Terrorist’s Veto: Why the First Amendment Must Protect Provocative 
Portrayals of the Prophet Muhammad, 12 NW. U. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 33 (2016) (“The intent of the 
speaker, and whether the speech is ‘directed to inciting,’ is critical to determining whether incitement 
occurred. It is this key element that distinguishes provocative speech from incitement.” (quoting 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2015)).  
115 See infra Part II (explaining that without a concession from Trump regarding the intent of his 
statements, the evidence of his intent is merely circumstantial). 
116 Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1186 (2005). Volokh 
adds that “when the law really requires a mens rea of purpose . . . decision[-]making necessarily 
requires a good deal more conjecture.” Id. (citations omitted). 
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category of speech related to violence—fighting words—lacks an intent 
element.117 Additionally, the Supreme Court has yet to definitively decide 
whether another brand of unprotected speech that portends violence—true 
threats—entails a mens rea component.118 
2. Imminence 
The second key facet of the Brandenburg test is imminence.119 
Problematically, as Professor Martin Redish points out, “[t]he Supreme 
Court has never explicitly laid out its understanding of 
the imminence required by the test.”120 Yet Redish asserts that “the test 
must require at least some showing of temporal imminence, lest the word 
be rendered linguistically incoherent.”121  
In other words, there must be a likelihood of the unlawful conduct 
                                                                                                                     
117 The Supreme Court held in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire that fighting words constitute one of 
the “well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech” that are not safeguarded by the First 
Amendment. 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942). The Court in Chaplinsky defined fighting words as those 
whose “very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” Id. at 572. The 
Court later specified that fighting words are limited to “personally abusive epithets which, when 
addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke 
violent reaction.” Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971). It added that the words must be directed 
to a particular person and be interpreted “as a direct personal insult.” Id. The fighting words test, 
however, lacks a mens rea component. As Justice Clarence Thomas recently wrote, fighting words may 
be prohibited “without proof of an intent to provoke a violent reaction.” Elonis v. United States, 135 S. 
Ct. 2001, 2027 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Professor Larry Alexander elaborates that “[r]equiring 
a mens rea of purpose serves no obvious free speech value. Nor is it consistent with the Court’s own 
approach to fighting words or to hostile audiences, neither of which require, as a precondition to 
sanctioning the speaker, that the speaker intend to provoke the audience to violence.” Larry Alexander, 
Redish on Freedom of Speech, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 593, 596 (2013) (emphasis in original omitted). 
118 In Elonis v. United States, the Court resolved a threats case on statutory grounds and thus 
found it “not necessary to consider any First Amendment issues.” 135 S.Ct. at 2012. The question 
presented to the Court in the Elonis petition was: Whether, consistent with the First Amendment and 
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), conviction of threatening another person requires proof of the 
defendant’s subjective intent to threaten, as required by the Ninth Circuit and the supreme courts of 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont; or whether it is enough to show that a “reasonable person” 
would regard the statement as threatening, as held by other federal courts of appeals and state courts of 
last resort. Question Presented, Elonis v. United States, 730 F.3d 321 (2015) (No. 13-983) (June 16, 
2014). See also Perez v. Florida, 137 S. Ct. 853, 855 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“The Court 
should also decide precisely what level of intent suffices under the First Amendment—a question we 
avoided two Terms ago in Elonis.”). Writing subsequent to the Court’s ruling in Elonis, Eugene Volokh 
notes that “the Court hasn’t even resolved whether statements are punishable only (a) if the speaker 
intends to put a person in fear, or whether it is enough that (b) a reasonable speaker would realize that 
the statement would put a person in fear.” Eugene Volokh, The “Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct” 
Exception, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 981, 1005 (2016). 
119 See supra note 34 and accompanying text (identifying the three key elements of the 
Brandenburg test). 
120 Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First Amendment: In Defense of 
Clear and Present Danger, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1159, 1180 (1982). 
121 Martin H. Redish & Michael J.T. Downey, Criminal Conspiracy as Free Expression, 76 ALB. 
L. REV. 697, 730 (2012–2013). 
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occurring “in the near future”122 and “within a very limited timeframe.”123 
As Redish encapsulates it, “most commentators have had little or no 
trouble concluding that the Court’s opinion in Brandenburg adopts a 
highly protective imminence test.”124 
Indeed, the Court in Hess v. Indiana125 made clear that “advocacy of 
illegal action at some indefinite future time”126—evidenced by the word 
“later” in the defendant’s statement “[w]e’ll take the fucking street 
later”127—fails to satisfy the imminence requirement.128 Thus, while 
Gregory Hess’s words during an anti-war protest “might tend to lead to 
violence, this did not satisfy the requirement that advocacy be directed at 
inciting or producing imminent lawless action that is likely to be 
produced.”129 Professor Dan Coenen recently dubbed this “the indefinite-
future logic of Hess.”130 Professor Michal Buchhandler-Raphael adds that 
“[i]n light of Hess, imminent means nothing but immediate action, which 
is an almost impossible burden to satisfy.”131 
Addressing the imminence element, Professor Enrique Armijo adds 
that “[a]n unspoken predicate for a finding of imminent incitement has 
traditionally been a shared physical space between speaker and 
audience.”132 Similarly, Joshua Azriel contends that “[t]he Brandenburg 
test applies to verbally spoken face-to-face speech”133 and “assumes a 
speaker-audience relationship that does not exist with Web sites.”134 
Chemerinsky emphasizes that a significant problem is the 
Brandenburg Court’s failure to explain how imminence should be 
                                                                                                                     
122 Id.  
123 Asma T. Uddin, Free Speech and Public Order Exceptions: A Case for the U.S. Standard, 
2015 BYU L. REV. 727, 762 (2015). 
124 Martin H. Redish, Unlawful Advocacy and Free Speech Theory: Rethinking the Lessons of the 
McCarthy Era, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 9, 65 (2004). 
125 414 U.S. 105 (1973). 
126 Id. at 108 (emphasis added). 
127 Id. at 107.  
128 See Mark Strasser, Incitement, Threats, and Constitutional Guarantees: First Amendment 
Protections pre- and post-Elonis, 14 U.N.H. L. REV. 163, 173 (2016) (examining the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Hess and emphasizing that “[t]he lack of imminence meant the speech at issue could 
not be criminalized under Brandenburg.”). 
129 R. Randall Kelso, The Structure of Modern Free Speech Doctrine: Strict Scrutiny, 
Intermediate Review, and “Reasonableness” Balancing, 8 ELON L. REV. 291, 328 (2016). 
130 Dan T. Coenen, Freedom of Speech and the Criminal Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1533, 1553 n.110 
(2017). 
131 Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Overcriminalizing Speech, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1667, 1677 
(2015) (emphasis added). 
132 Enrique Armijo, Kill Switches, Forum Doctrine, and the First Amendment’s Digital Future, 32 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 411, 459 (2014). 
133 Joshua Azriel, The Internet and Hate Speech: An Examination of the Nuremberg Files Case, 
10 COMM. L. & POL’Y 477, 496 (2005). 
134 Id. at 495–96. 
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appraised.135 In practice, Brandenburg’s imminence element requires 
government officials to “exercise restraint in their regulation of expressive 
freedoms unless the exercise of those freedoms threatens imminent 
harm.”136 In other words, police must refrain from arresting a speaker if the 
possibility of harm is too distant. As Professor Margot Kaminski states: 
Brandenburg suggests that when action is advocated far 
enough in advance, police can prepare for it and avert danger 
through preparation; therefore, suppression or punishment of 
non-imminent speech is not allowed. It is only when the 
danger is so imminent that police cannot prepare themselves 
that regulation of incitement is justified.137  
With this background on Brandenburg’s imminence component in 
mind, the next section turns to the likelihood element. 
3. Likelihood 
The Court in Brandenburg held that speech is proscribed as incitement 
only if it “is likely to incite or produce”138 violence or unlawful conduct. 
Unfortunately, as Professor Thomas Healy points out, “Brandenburg does 
not tell us how likely it must be that speech will lead to unlawful 
conduct.”139 Furthermore, Brandenburg fails to answer how likelihood is to 
be appraised.140 
Despite such flaws, likelihood is an important facet of Brandenburg. 
That is because, even if a speaker intends for violence to occur—the first 
of the three key elements141—he nonetheless will be protected if he is 
ineffectual or inept in steeling an audience to action.142 Put differently, a 
non-persuasive speaker is less likely to have his words followed. Viewed 
collectively, Brandenburg’s likelihood and imminence requirements 
ensure “that the danger is in fact not speculative and that the government’s 
interest in preventing the violence is not pretextual.”143 
It seems clear, however, that past violent reactions to a speaker’s 
words can serve as evidence in predicting whether they are likely to cause 
violence in the future. For instance, in considering whether the Internet 
                                                                                                                     
135 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 108, at 1375. 
136 John Inazu, Unlawful Assembly as Social Control, 64 UCLA L. REV. 2, 38 (2017). 
137 Kaminski, supra note 18, at 81. 
138 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (emphasis added). 
139 Thomas Healy, Brandenburg in a Time of Terror, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 655, 660 (2009) 
(emphasis added). 
140 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 108, at 1375. 
141 See supra Section I.A.1 (footnote omitted) (presenting the three elements). 
142 See Gilles, supra note 31, at 523 (footnote omitted) (noting that Brandenburg protects 
“ineffective” speakers). 
143 S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy & Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Recalibrating the Cost of Harm 
Advocacy: Getting Beyond Brandenburg, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159, 1197 (2000). 
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postings of white supremacist William White constituted incitement under 
Brandenburg, a federal district court in 2013 reasoned: 
[T]he evidence fails to establish that White’s postings have 
previously inspired any action—imminent or otherwise. In 
the absence of such evidence, the fact that White published 
his statements to the Internet, alone—although deeply 
troubling—is not enough to show that the actions suggested 
therein were likely to be immediately carried out by White’s 
readers.144  
Thus, likelihood ultimately depends on a contextual approach that 
accounts not only for the words used, but also the surrounding context in 
which those words are uttered. Context includes, as Professor David 
Crump asserts, the medium through which the message is conveyed, the 
audience to whom it is addressed, and other related messages.145 
 With this primer on Brandenburg in mind, the next Section briefly 
reviews the heckler’s veto principle. 
B. The Heckler’s Veto Principle 
The heckler’s veto principle, as Professor Brett Johnson recently 
wrote, is the precept “that state actors have a duty to protect speakers from 
hostile audiences who would seek to either do harm to speakers or threaten 
to do harm and thereby force law enforcement to silence speakers.”146 A 
heckler’s veto thus occurs “when a crowd or audience’s reaction to a 
speech or message is allowed to control or silence that speech or 
message.”147  
Imagine, for instance, a comedian being heckled off the stage at a 
comedy club during his act. That would be tantamount to a heckler’s veto. 
If the club were run by the government, however, it would be obligated to 
protect the comedian and allow his performance to continue unimpeded. 
In the typical heckler’s veto scenario, “an unpopular minority has 
insisted upon exercising its rights in spite of the probable opposition of the 
majority of the community.”148 That certainly is the case when white 
nationalist Richard Spencer speaks on public university campuses, as Part 
III later examines. For example, when Spencer spoke in October 2017 at 
                                                                                                                     
144 In re White, No. 2:07cv342, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133148, at *221 (E.D. Va. Sept. 13, 2013) 
(emphasis added) (order denying motion for sanctions). 
145 David Crump, Camouflaged Incitement: Freedom of Speech, Communicative Torts, and the 
Borderland of the Brandenburg Test, 29 GA. L. REV. 1, 56 (1994). 
146 Brett G. Johnson, The Heckler’s Veto: Using First Amendment Theory and Jurisprudence to 
Understand Current Audience Reactions Against Controversial Speech, 21 COMM. L. & POL’Y 175, 
219 (2016). 
147 CLAY CALVERT ET AL., MASS MEDIA LAW 44 (20th ed. 2018). 
148 Ruth McGaffey, The Heckler’s Veto: A Reexamination, 57 MARQ. L. REV. 39, 39 (1973).  
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the University of Florida, his disquieting views drew overwhelming 
opposition and required enormous law enforcement presence to maintain 
the peace.149  
The heckler’s veto doctrine holds that public universities, as 
government actors, must protect Spencer’s offensive speech150 because 
they cannot “hide behind the unpleasant reaction of some portions of the 
public in order to silence a speaker.”151 As Owen Fiss summarized it, the 
doctrine “recognizes that when a mob is angered by a speaker and 
jeopardizes the public order by threatening the speaker, the policeman 
must act to preserve the opportunity of an individual to speak. The duty of 
the policeman is to restrain the mob.”152  
By analyzing recent lawsuits filed on behalf of Richard Spencer, Part 
III explores the tension between the heckler’s veto doctrine and 
Brandenburg’s likelihood requirement.153 Specifically, Part III argues that 
the more money universities spend on police to prevent a heckler’s veto 
and to safeguard Spencer’s right to speak,154 the less likely it is that his 
words will constitute unlawful incitement under Brandenburg.155 That is 
because a massive law enforcement turnout not only reduces the chances 
of Spencer being attacked by a hostile mob, but also makes it less probable 
his followers will commit violence, assuming they recognize the increased 
odds of being arrested. This result, Part III argues, is somewhat 
disconcerting.  
It means there will be some instances where the government pays to 
protect speech that, were it not for the heckler’s veto doctrine and a large 
police presence, could be cut off and suppressed under Brandenburg. In 
                                                                                                                     
149 See Andrew Pantazi & Nate Monroe, Shouting Match; Hostile Audience Drowns Out White 
Nationalist’s Speech, FLA. TIMES-UNION (Oct. 20, 2017), at A-1 (“A crowd of protesters filled a 
University of Florida hall . . . and greeted the white nationalist Richard Spencer with mocking chants 
and raised fists, denying the provocateur an unchallenged platform to share his widely derided views on 
race in America . . . . Thousands had swamped the university to challenge Spencer’s appearance, which 
cost about $600,000 for security and had prompted Gov. Rick Scott to declare a state of emergency for 
the area.”). 
150 See Mark A. Rabinowitz, Nazis in Skokie: Fighting Words or Heckler’s Veto, 28 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 259, 274–75 (1979) (“The principle underlying the Heckler’s Veto Doctrine is that freedom of 
speech may not be abridged merely because the content of such speech may be offensive to some of the 
hearers.” (footnote omitted)). 
151 Cheryl A. Leanza, Heckler’s Veto Case Law as aResource for Democratic Discourse, 35 
HOFSTRA L. REV.1305, 1306 (2007).  
152 Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1417 (1986). 
153 See supra Section I.A.3 (addressing the likelihood facet of the Brandenburg incitement test). 
154 In Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992), the Supreme Court held 
unconstitutional an ordinance that permitted “a government administrator to vary the fee for assembling 
or parading to reflect the estimated cost of maintaining public order.” Id. at 124. Writing for a five-
justice majority, Harry Blackmun reasoned that “[s]peech cannot be financially burdened, any more 
than it can be punished or banned, simply because it might offend a hostile mob.” Id. at 134–35 
(citations omitted).  
155 See infra Section III (presenting this argument). 
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other words, Spencer can get away with words that—were it not for the 
appearance of police mandated by the heckler’s veto canon—Brandenburg 
would squelch. Attendance by government-paid police thus assists Spencer 
in two ways: first, by reducing the odds his speech will be silenced by a 
heckler’s veto, and second, by decreasing the likelihood his speech will 
spark his supporters to commit violence. 
C. Prior Restraints on Expression 
Although the definition of “prior restraint” is contested,156 it is 
generally considered a “restraint on future speech”157 and frequently takes 
the form of a “court order[] that actually forbid[s] speech activities.”158 Put 
slightly differently, “[a] prior restraint is an official restriction upon a 
communication before it is published.”159 Twin tenets of First Amendment 
jurisprudence, in turn, hold that such restraints are presumptively 
unconstitutional,160 and that the government carries a “heavy burden of 
attempting to overcome that presumption.”161 As Professor Edward Carter 
writes, “[t]here is a deep and longstanding aversion in First Amendment 
jurisprudence to prior restraints.”162  
While prior restraints imposed by the government are presumptively 
invalid, the Supreme Court allows them in a few specific circumstances.163 
                                                                                                                     
156 See Michael I. Meyerson, The Neglected History of the Prior Restraint Doctrine: 
Rediscovering the Link Between the First Amendment and the Separation of Powers, 34 IND. L. REV. 
295, 297 (2001) (“[T]here is currently no generally-accepted legal definition of the prior restraint 
doctrine.”); Marin Scordato, Distinction Without a Difference: A Reappraisal of the Doctrine of Prior 
Restraint, 68 N.C. L. REV. 1, 2 (1989) (“Despite the frequency with which the doctrine of prior 
restraint is cited in court opinions and the level of general recognition it has achieved, relevant case law 
does not provide a concise and logically coherent definition of a prior restraint on speech.”). 
157 Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993). 
158 Id.  
159 James L. Oakes, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint Since the Pentagon Papers, 15 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 497, 498 (1982). 
160 See Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 556 (1976) (observing that the First Amendment 
guarantees of free speech and a free press “afford special protection against orders that prohibit the 
publication or broadcast of particular information or commentary—orders that impose a ‘previous’ or 
‘prior’ restraint on speech”); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (“Any system of 
prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional 
validity.”). 
161 Steven Helle, Prior Restraint by the Backdoor: Conditional Rights, 39 VILL. L. REV. 817, 842 
(1994) (footnote omitted). 
162 Edward L. Carter & Brad Clark, Death of Procedural Safeguards: Prior Restraint, Due 
Process and the Elusive First Amendment Value of Content Neutrality, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 225, 
228 (2006). 
163 See Ariel L. Bendor, Prior Restraint, Incommensurability, and the Constitutionalism of Means, 
68 FORDHAM L. REV. 289, 299 (1999) (“Like freedom of speech, however, the prohibition against 
prior restraint of speech is not absolute. A line of exceptions allows the application of prior restraint in 
certain circumstances.”). 
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Most notably, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes’s “famous dicta”164 in 
Near v. Minnesota165 in 1931 articulated several instances where prior 
restraints might be constitutional.166 Forty years later, Justice William 
Brennan used a part of that dicta to support his stance in New York Times 
Co. v. United States.167 Justice Brennan wrote there that “only 
governmental allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, 
directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to 
imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea can support even the 
issuance of an interim restraining order.”168  
Significantly for purposes of this Article, the Court in Near suggested 
that prior restraints may be permissible to protect “[t]he security of the 
community life . . . against incitements to acts of violence.”169 The Court’s 
current test for incitement to acts of violence, of course, is the 
Brandenburg standard.170 Thus, when police on the scene believe Richard 
Spencer’s continued speaking will incite imminent and likely violence, 
they can order him—per Brandenburg—to stop talking. This constitutes a 
prior restraint because Spencer is stifled from continuing with and 
finishing his speech.  
Yet this scenario is particularly troubling because the prior restraint on 
Spencer occurs without, as First Amendment scholar Martin Redish 
characterizes it, the benefit of “a full and fair hearing before an 
independent judicial forum.”171 Redish points out that although “[t]he 
requirement of a full and fair hearing before an independent judicial forum 
for the adjudication of constitutional rights is a widely accepted premise of 
modern constitutional thinking,”172 this “principle has received inconsistent 
attention in the Supreme Court’s decisions applying the prior restraint 
                                                                                                                     
164 Christopher Dunn, Balancing the Right to Protest in the Aftermath of September 11, 40 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 327, 329 (2005). 
165 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
166 See id. at 716 (identifying times of war, “obscene publications,” and “incitements to acts of 
violence and the overthrow by force of orderly government” as the “exceptional cases” when a 
“previous restraint” may be permissible). 
167 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
168 Id. at 726–27 (Brennan, J., concurring). See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and 
Scapegoats: The Press and National Security Information, 83 IND. L.J. 233, 279 (2008) (noting that 
“[Justice] Brennan drew this standard from dicta in the Court’s prior opinion in Near v. Minnesota,” 
particularly, Near’s statement “that prior restraints are permissible in cases involving ‘actual 
obstruction to [the government’s] recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports 
or the number and location of troops’”) (quoting Near, 283 U.S. at 716). 
169 Near, 283 U.S. at 716. 
170 See Uddin, supra note 123, at 770 (“The Court announced its current test, incitement to 
imminent violence, in Brandenburg v. Ohio in 1969.”). 
171 Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment 
Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53, 100 (1984). 
172 Id. at 55. 
 2019] FIRST AMENDMENT ENVELOPE PUSHERS 139 
doctrine.”173 
It is more than a little bit conceivable, in turn, that a judge might later 
conclude the police, under the heat and pressure of the moment to make a 
snap judgment, erred in stopping Spencer’s speech—that his words had not 
risen to the level of Brandenburg incitement—and violated his First 
Amendment rights. This issue, as well as whether Brandenburg can serve 
as a prior restraint tool to preemptively stop Spencer from even appearing 
on a campus due to earlier violence elsewhere, is explored in Part III. 
With this primer on the incitement test, the heckler’s veto doctrine and 
the presumption against prior restraints providing necessary context, the 
next Part of the Article illustrates how In re Trump exposes key problems 
for courts tasked with applying Brandenburg in situations where no clear 
exhortation to violence exists. 
II. EXAMINING IN RE TRUMP MORE CLOSELY: PROBLEMS WITH PROVING 
INTENT AND LIKELIHOOD 
This Part has two sections. The first examines the question of intent 
under Brandenburg in In re Trump, while the second analyzes the issue of 
likelihood. 
A. Trump’s Intent  
As addressed earlier, speech that incites violence is unprotected by the 
First Amendment only when the speaker intends for it to occur.174 Unless 
this mens rea requirement is satisfied, Brandenburg shields the speaker 
from criminal punishment. Therefore, a critical question in In re Trump is: 
What was Donald Trump’s intent when, during a 2016 campaign rally, he 
“responded to protesters by stating, ‘Get ’em out of here,’ followed closely 
by, ‘Don’t hurt ’em—if I say go ‘get ’em,’ I get in trouble with the 
press’”?175 Did Trump intend for those statements to spark crowd members 
to attack the plaintiffs? 
Resolving this issue is anything but straightforward. Why? Because the 
only possible path for concluding that Trump intended to incite violence 
runs headfirst through a thicket of circumstantial evidence. One must plow 
through indirect evidence and contextual clues because Trump denies his 
words were “directed at the crowd.”176 Instead, he claims they were 
“intended for professional security personnel to remove the protestors.”177  
                                                                                                                     
173 Id. at 56. 
174 See supra Section I.A.1 (discussing the intent prong of the Brandenburg test). 
175 In re Trump, 874 F.3d 948, 950 (6th Cir. 2017). 
176 Answer of Defendants Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, and Donald J. Trump 
for President, Inc., at 5, Nwanguma v. Trump, 273 F. Supp. 3d 719 (W.D. Ky. 2017) (No. 3:16-cv-
00247).  
177 Nwanguma v. Trump, 273 F. Supp. 3d 719, 725 (W.D. Ky. 2017) ), rev’d and remanded, 903 
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In other words, rather than calling for violence or unlawful conduct by 
audience members, Trump contends he simply was “calling for the 
removal of disruptive protestors”178 by security officers. In brief, he does 
not concede Brandenburg’s intent element. This means, in turn, that 
Trump’s intent must be proven by something other than his own 
admission. 
What circumstantial evidence, then, might be relevant of intent? Three 
items seem important: (1) the actual words used (as well as words not 
used); (2) the speaker’s understanding of the state of mind of the audience 
members who hear those words; and (3) the speaker’s familiarity with how 
those same or similar words were received and interpreted in the past by 
the same or similar audiences.  
As Judge Hale explained, “whether speech constitutes incitement is a 
fact-specific inquiry”179 and “context matters.”180 Examining all of the 
facts, including the words used and perhaps even the words not used, thus 
is essential. 
1. The Words Used 
Perhaps a suitable starting point is to pose a question: Did Trump’s 
words directly reference either violence or unlawful action? The answer is 
no. As Trump asserts, “he did not say a single word about unlawful force 
or violence.”181 In fact, the president points out “he affirmatively 
discouraged violence by telling the audience, ‘Don’t hurt ’em.’”182  
In other words, Trump did not utter statements such as “beat ’em up,” 
“punch those people” or even “throw ’em out of here.” Those three 
messages all carry physical overtones—beating, punching and throwing. 
Instead, Trump simply said, “get ’em out of here.”183 He added nothing 
about precisely how the protestors were to be, as it were, gotten out of 
there. 
But at the trial court level, Judge David Hale focused on another aspect 
of Trump’s words—namely, that they were organized by Trump in the 
form of “an order, an instruction, a command.”184 It was “the 
imperative”185 nature of Trump’s words that, for Judge Hale, made 
                                                                                                                     
F.3d 604 (6th Cir. 2018).  
178 Petition for Mandamus, supra note 60.  
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plausible the protestors’ claim that Trump was advocating violence. A 
second circumstantial factor in the intent inquiry therefore is whether 
words that do not directly reference violence are nonetheless strung 
together and framed in the form of a directive to take action. 
A third circumstantial factor weighing on intent might entail 
considering the absence of certain clarifying words that Trump failed to 
utter but easily could have. For instance, if Trump’s true intent was to have 
his security personnel remove the protestors from the rally, then why didn’t 
Trump add one simple, obvious word—specifically, “security”—to his 
initial utterance? Why didn’t he say, “Security, get ’em out of here” or 
“Get ’em out of here, security”? This phrasing clearly would militate 
against finding that Trump intended for audience members—as opposed to 
security officials—to “get ’em out of here.” Thus, was Trump’s decision 
not to use “security” strategic, creating sufficient ambiguity in his message 
that he knew his followers might construe it as a call to action? A court 
groping for circumstantial evidence of a speaker’s intent therefore might 
consider not simply the words used, but also the words not used—the ones 
left unspoken that easily could have been voiced. 
Fourth, one might consider that Trump has a well-known tendency to 
utter short, declarative phrases with hyperbolic and rhetorical overtones—
particularly on Twitter.186 His “uninhibited”187 tweeting and “pugnacious 
rhetoric”188 might indicate that similar short statements at campaign 
rallies—“get ’em out of here”—are not intended to incite violence, but 
simply are designed to chum the political waters. As one New York judge 
recently reasoned in dismissing a defamation claim against Trump based 
on a series of tweets, the President’s tweets were “loose, figurative, and 
hyperbolic.”189 Such circumstantial evidence of Trump’s intent based on 
his style of tweets, however, seems too far removed from the nature of his 
in-person words uttered at real-world campaign rallies to be of much 
relevance. In other words, the context of Twitter is simply too distinct from 
that of a campaign rally to have any bearing on the issue of intent. 
None of this, however, necessarily ends the inquiry into the nature of 
                                                                                                                     
186 See generally Katie Rogers & Maggie Haberman, Like Father Like Son, Using Twitter as a 
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Trump’s statement. Why? As Professor Michael Vitiello notes in reference 
to an observation by famed Harvard First Amendment scholar Zechariah 
Chafee, “Marc Antony avoided making explicit incitement to avenge 
Caesar’s assassination. But any reasonable listener would have understood 
that to be his message.”190 Professor David Crump aptly calls this 
“camouflaged incitement,”191 meaning situations “without words of 
express incitement.”192 More bluntly, it is possible for a person to 
deliberately code a message advocating violence rather than blatantly 
stating it. 
Crump points out that Brandenburg says nothing about the incitement 
test being fulfilled only by examining the literal words used.193 Instead, 
“Brandenburg leaves all relevant factors open to consideration, including 
the context, the medium, the audience, and the speaker.”194 It thus is worth 
considering the state of the audience that attended his Louisville rally in 
the next subsection.  
2. The Speaker’s Understanding of the Audience’s State of Mind 
A court might consider, as circumstantial evidence of Donald Trump’s 
intent, his awareness or lack thereof of whether his supporters at the rally 
were already riled up immediately before he exclaimed “get ’em out of 
here.” In other words, if Trump perceived from his vantage point on the 
stage that the individuals who were next to (or in very close physical 
proximity to) the protestors were already agitated or stirred up, this might 
indicate that he intended his words to spark violence. The logic here—were 
a court to follow this path—would be that Trump recognized he didn’t 
need to use words directly referencing violence because, under the 
circumstances, he knew the more neutral sounding “get ’em out of here” 
would likely produce the same violent result. Trump’s understanding of his 
audience’s state of mind—its readiness and willingness to pounce, as it 
were—thereby might be relevant on the intent inquiry. 
Similarly, if Trump knew that there were violent skirmishes between 
his supporters and protestors immediately prior to taking the podium to 
begin his talk, then this might indicate that Trump intended his words to 
cause violence. In other words, if Trump knew violence had already 
transpired—that his supporters were in a fighting mood—then this might 
indicate that a directive to take action like “get ’em out of here” was 
intended to spark further trouble.  
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3. The Speaker’s Knowledge of Prior Responses to the Words 
If Trump knew that his use of the phrase “get ’em out of here” or 
something substantially similar to it had triggered violence by his 
supporters against protestors at prior campaign rallies in other cities, then 
this might serve as circumstantial evidence of his intent for them to once 
again spark violence, this time in Louisville. The logic here is that a 
reasonable speaker who used a phrase in the past that caused violence 
would avoid using that same phrase again in order to prevent such a 
disturbance. Who, in other words, would want to use a message that caused 
trouble in the past? Law abiding people seemingly would not. A person 
who intended to trigger violence, however, would use the phrase again 
because of that person’s prior success with provoking it.  
Importantly, however, there is a critical difference between mere 
knowledge that violence might occur by using certain words, on the one 
hand, and the actual intent to cause it to occur, on the other.195 The 
Brandenburg test demands the latter for speech to be unprotected. A judge 
thus would need to make a leap in logic that bridges knowledge with intent 
when considering whether knowledge that a message caused violence in 
the past constitutes circumstantial evidence of present intent. 
Ultimately, as the analysis above suggests, fathoming intent to commit 
violence from circumstantial evidence amounts to little more than a 
guessing game. In cases such as In re Trump—ones in which a speaker 
both vehemently denies an intent to commit violence and uses words that 
do not directly reference violence—proving intent under Brandenburg is a 
steep, uphill battle. 
B. Trump and the Likelihood of Violence: Considering Prior Violence 
As described earlier, Brandenburg requires that violence or unlawful 
conduct must be likely to occur for speech to fall beyond First Amendment 
protection.196 A key issue for cases such as In re Trump, therefore, is the 
weight that should be assigned in the likelihood analysis to prior acts of 
violence committed by a speaker’s supporters. Indeed, subsequent to the 
event in Louisville that sparked the lawsuit examined in this article, several 
incidents of violence arose at Trump rallies.197 These after-the-fact violent 
events obviously would not affect the likelihood factor in In re Trump. 
They would, however, be relevant in future incitement cases involving 
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altercations at Trump’s speaking engagements. 
How, then, should a court determine likelihood of violence in 
scenarios such as In re Trump? As a starting point, a positive correlation 
between past acts of violence, on the one hand, and a present likelihood of 
violence, on the other, seems ripe for judicial consideration. In other 
words, the greater the number of incidents of violence associated with 
Trump’s words in the past, the greater the odds of violence occurring in the 
present. 
In examining past incidents of violence, however, several factors seem 
essential for judicial examination beyond simply the sheer number of prior 
acts of violence. In brief, courts must dig deeper than raw numerosity. 
Three additional factors seem especially relevant. They are proposed 
immediately below. 
First, a court might apply what this article calls a ratio-based factor—
one that contextualizes the number of incidents of past violence at Trump 
speaking events with the total number of Trump speaking events, including 
those at which no violence occurred. If, hypothetically, Trump had made 
100 speaking appearances in the prior six months and violence had erupted 
at ten of those events, then does this ten percent frequency provide either a 
court or a police officer on the scene of a Trump rally with a lawful reason 
under Brandenburg to predict that violence is likely to occur again? What 
if violence had arisen forty percent of the time at prior Trump speeches? 
Brandenburg offers no such formula or guidance, instead leaving the 
likelihood determination to a rough, speculative estimate by a judge or 
officer. Indeed, Brandenburg even fails to modify the term “likely” with 
words such as “reasonably,” “substantially,” or “highly”—modifiers that 
might add clarity to the test by establishing a threshold of likelihood.198 
Second, courts also should account for the amount of time that has 
lapsed or transpired since a prior incident occurred. This constitutes a 
temporal-distance factor. Here, the formula is: the longer the lag time, the 
less the likelihood. This would particularly be the case if several speeches 
had occurred peacefully subsequent to the last incident of violence. Put 
differently: the more recent the prior acts of violence, the more likely 
violence is to occur. Again, however, Brandenburg is maddingly silent on 
such a consideration.  
Third, even if there have been both numerous and recent incidents of 
violence, the likelihood factor is not inevitably elevated. That might be the 
case if—precisely because of such recent incidents—a speaker 
significantly ratchets up the level of security and law enforcement presence 
for current and future events. This law enforcement-presence factor thus 
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requires a judge (in the courtroom after an event) or an officer (on the 
scene at the event, watching and ready to stop it if need be under 
Brandenburg) to consider how crowd members might respond if they see a 
massive law enforcement presence. The logic here is that a large turnout by 
law enforcement would reduce the odds of the speaker inciting violence 
because crowd members would not want to risk arrest and, in turn, a 
criminal record and possible incarceration. In brief, a strong, highly visible 
showing of security forces might deter violence. Deterrence means that the 
likelihood of violence is reduced, and Brandenburg requires violence to be 
likely for speech to be unprotected. The Court’s decision in Brandenburg, 
however, did not address this consideration. 
The factual scenario at the heart of In re Trump thus illustrates 
multiple problems with determining likelihood of violence under 
Brandenburg. This Article, in turn, proposes three variables—ones beyond 
the raw numerosity of prior incidents of violence—to add rigor to the 
likelihood analysis. The three variables are: (1) the ratio-based factor; (2) 
the temporal-distance factor; and (3) the law enforcement-presence factor. 
This list is not intended to exclude other considerations from judicial 
analysis, but simply is designed to serve as a consistent, core collection of 
variables. 
In summary, this Part used In re Trump to demonstrate the complexity 
of proving both the intent and likelihood elements of Brandenburg. 
Fathoming intent becomes a legal nightmare in cases such as In re Trump 
where the speaker denies desire to foment violence. Circumstantial 
evidence thus is necessary to prove intent, and this Article has offered four 
factors to help guide this analysis. These factors are: (1) the words used; 
(2) the words not used; (3) the speaker’s understanding of his audience’s 
state of mind; and (4) the speaker’s knowledge of prior responses to the 
words used. Similarly, this Article has advanced three suggestions to 
improve the likelihood determination: the ratio of prior acts of violence to 
all speeches given by the defendant, the lag time or gap between the most 
recent incident of violence and the present event, and the size and visibility 
of law enforcement at the present event. 
This Article next examines other Brandenburg issues that are 
highlighted by the recent spate of lawsuits filed against public universities 
on behalf of Richard Spencer.  
III. INCITEMENT, PRIOR RESTRAINTS, & THE HECKER’S VETO: EXPOSING 
AN UNEASY RELATIONSHIP AMONG FREE-SPEECH DOCTRINES THROUGH 
THE LENS OF THE RICHARD SPENCER LAWSUITS 
At the same time Brandenburg takes center stage in the case against 
Donald Trump, the case is enmeshed in multiple lawsuits filed on behalf of 
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Richard Spencer against major public universities.199 The institutions 
caught in the legal crosshairs want to prevent Spencer, “president of the 
National Policy Institute, a white nationalist think tank,”200 from speaking. 
They fear that either his mere presence or his words will incite violence.201 
As University of Florida President Kent Fuchs explained his initial 
decision to deny Spencer access, “it was about violence”202 and public 
safety.203 Indeed, a January 2018 article in the Washington Post notes that 
Spencer’s potential campus appearances “put public schools in the difficult 
position of balancing the First Amendment with their concerns about 
safety.”204 
For example, Pennsylvania State University President Eric Barron 
echoed key language from Brandenburg when his institution denied 
Spencer access in August 2017. As Barron put it, “the First Amendment 
does not require our University to risk imminent violence”205 and “the 
likelihood of disruption and violence.”206 Those statements tap directly into 
both the imminence and likelihood elements of Brandenburg.207 
Fears of trouble caused by Spencer’s presence stem from the August 
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2017 violence in Charlottesville, Virginia, where he was present for a 
Unite the Right rally.208 Although a report released that December blamed 
the mayhem on factors other than Spencer,209 Charlottesville became 
central to universities’ efforts to deny him access to their campuses. For 
example, when Michigan State University initially denied Spencer access 
to its campus, it maintained that “[t]he decision was made due to 
significant concerns about public safety in the wake of the tragic violence 
at a rally in Charlottesville.”210 
Brandenburg, as discussed below, may provide public universities 
with an entrée for stopping Richard Spencer from talking on campus. 
Several other legal arguments, however, simply don’t hold water. For 
instance, squelching Spencer based on his controversial, white-nationalist 
position violates the well-established principle against viewpoint 
discrimination.211 As Justice Anthony Kennedy explained in 2017, 
viewpoint discrimination is a “subtype”212 of content-based speech 
regulation.213 It occurs when the government regulates speech within a 
particular subject matter by singling “out a subset of messages for disfavor 
based on the views expressed.”214 Kennedy elaborated that principle with: 
The danger of viewpoint discrimination is that the government is 
attempting to remove certain ideas or perspectives from a broader debate. 
That danger is all the greater if the ideas or perspectives are ones a 
particular audience might think offensive, at least at first hearing. An initial 
reaction may prompt further reflection, leading to a more reasoned, more 
tolerant position.215Similarly, blocking Spencer from campus because his 
views offend is unconstitutional. As Justice William Brennan wrote for the 
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Court in protecting the right to burn the American flag as a form of 
symbolic expression, “If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First 
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of 
an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or 
disagreeable.”216 In a nutshell, it is unconstitutional to ban a contentious 
speaker, such as Richard Spencer, either because of his viewpoint or 
because of the offense others take.  
It thus is unsurprising that when U.S. District Judge W. Keith Watkins 
ordered Auburn University to allow Spencer to speak on campus in April 
2017, he reasoned that the institution: 
[C]ancelled the speech based on its belief that listeners and 
protest groups opposed to Mr. Spencer’s ideology would 
react to the content of his speech by engaging in protests that 
could cause violence or property damage. However, 
discrimination on the basis of message content “cannot be 
tolerated under the First Amendment,” and “[l]isteners’ 
reaction to speech is not a content-neutral basis for 
regulation.”217 
The proper test to apply—the one Judge Watkins, in fact, applied—
was Brandenburg.218 He found that “Auburn did not produce evidence that 
Mr. Spencer’s speech is likely to incite or produce imminent lawless 
action.”219 Watkins’s decision, however, occurred prior to the 
Charlottesville violence.  
Before examining how Brandenburg applies in post-Charlottesville 
cases involving Richard Spencer, it is important to briefly address the 
fighting words exception to First Amendment protection established in 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.220 Might Chaplinsky be used successfully 
to stop Spencer from speaking? It is highly doubtful.  
The fighting words exception would only silence Richard Spencer if he 
used personally abusive epithets directed at specific individuals in a face-
to-face situation.221 The fighting words doctrine targets words “that are so 
insulting in both content and delivery that they are likely to provoke the 
listener to respond violently.”222 As the Supreme Court explained in 1989, 
fighting words involve “a direct personal insult or an invitation to 
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exchange fisticuffs.”223 Racist views like Spencer’s positions, standing 
alone, do not amount to fighting words.224 Furthermore, the Supreme Court 
has not upheld a fighting words conviction since Chaplinsky.225 There is no 
evidence that Richard Spencer yells racist epithets directly at minorities in 
a face-to-face fighting words scenario.226  
Additionally, because “courts must determine on a case-by-case basis 
all of the circumstances relevant to whether a reasonable person in the 
position of the actual addressee would have been likely to respond with 
violence,”227 the fighting words doctrine simply cannot be used as a blunt, 
preemptive-strike mechanism to stop a person from coming to campus. A 
person must have the opportunity to utter some words before he or she can 
be squelched for engaging in fighting words. 
In summary, dual First Amendment doctrines that prohibit viewpoint 
discrimination and protect offensive expression tilt in favor of Richard 
Spencer’s right to speak at public universities. Additionally, the fighting 
words exception to First Amendment protection does not permit banning 
him from campus; it would only apply if he starts to speak and then 
engages in targeted, personally abusive epithets. Public universities are 
therefore largely left clinging to the Brandenburg test if they want to 
permissibly silence Richard Spencer on campus. 
This raises an important series of questions. Can Brandenburg be used 
to stop Richard Spencer from ever stepping foot on campus? Does it 
provide a public university with a tool for enacting a prior restraint on his 
presence based upon past violence on other campuses? Or alternatively, 
does Brandenburg come into play only after Spencer begins speaking? 
Must an individual like Spencer—one who carries with him (at least, as 
public universities want to portray it) a past history of violence—be 
afforded the chance to start talking before Brandenburg becomes relevant? 
As described above, prior restraints are presumptively 
unconstitutional.228 Yet, the Supreme Court in Near v. Minnesota229 
suggested they are permissible to protect “[t]he security of the community 
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life . . . against incitements to acts of violence . . . .”230 In other words, 
Near provides a bridge to Brandenburg. Interpreted broadly, this suggests 
Brandenburg can function as a prior restraint vehicle—but this is only 
partially correct.  
Brandenburg is merely a cutoff mechanism; it can be used to cut off a 
person who is presently talking, thereby restraining in advance whatever 
portion of the person’s planned speech remains. More colloquially, 
Brandenburg can only quiet a person based upon what he is saying, not 
based upon what he has said on prior occasions. Until a person begins 
saying something, Brandenburg is impotent to stop him. In brief, Richard 
Spencer must be given the opportunity to begin speaking. Once he 
commences, police may then stifle him under Brandenburg if they believe 
his words are both intended and likely to produce imminent violence.  
Using Brandenburg preemptively—specifically, using it to stop 
Spencer before he even has a chance to begin his speech—would allow 
government entities to silence him merely because they think they know 
what he is going to say in the future. In other words, Public University X 
would be able to stop Spencer from speaking on its campus because it 
believes he is going to say the exact same thing he said on the campus of 
Public University Y. Using Brandenburg in this fashion would permit the 
government to stop speech based on mere speculation and supposition 
about not only what a person would be saying, but also about what his 
intent (a key element of Brandenburg231) would be with those words. Thus, 
much like a libel-proof plaintiff who is condemned by his prior bad acts,232 
Spencer would be perpetually damned in the eyes of the law under 
Brandenburg based upon his past bad words. 
It is not inconceivable that Spencer might, in fact, want to test out a 
different tack or approach to conveying his message when visiting 
campuses, hoping to find a better way to market and sell his views. After 
all, if Spencer wants to win over potential new followers, why would he 
keep peddling a failed product?233 To ban Spencer based on his past speech 
is to cynically suppose that his views—or at least his strategies for 
conveying them—will never evolve or change. He must be provided the 
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opportunity to speak before censorship under Brandenburg is permitted. 
Furthermore, Brandenburg’s imminence requirement dispels the 
notion that the test can be used preemptively.234 This is due to the fact that, 
if imminence requires a close temporal connection between the words 
uttered and the violence that is likely to follow, then stopping a speaker 
based on words that were uttered days, weeks, or even months in the past 
fails to satisfy this Brandenburg criterion. The gap in time is simply too 
long to satisfy Brandenburg’s imminence facet. The Richard Spencer cases 
thus reveal the complex relationship between prior restraints and 
incitement of violence. 
The cases also illustrate the relationship between Brandenburg—
specifically, Brandenburg’s “likelihood” requirement235—and the heckler’s 
veto doctrine.236 As Professor R. George Wright describes it, the heckler’s 
veto doctrine states that “opponents of a speaker should not be permitted to 
suppress the speech in question through their own threatened or actual 
violence.”237 
When law enforcement personnel turn out in large numbers to prevent 
Richard Spencer from being the victim of a heckler’s veto—as illustrated 
by this exact occurrence at the University of Florida in October 2017238—
the Brandenburg analysis is necessarily impacted. The larger the presence 
of police to prevent a heckler’s veto, the less likely it is that violence will 
occur—assuming, of course, that most reasonable people do not want to be 
arrested.239 In brief, there is an inverse correlation between the number of 
police at a Spencer campus speech, and the likelihood of that speech 
causing violence; as the number of police officers increases, the likelihood 
of violence decreases because the odds of being arrested are higher. 
The canon against allowing a heckler’s veto thus helps Richard 
Spencer in two ways. First, it prevents him from being attacked by 
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protestors. The government, in fact, funds the police, as it did at the 
University of Florida, to keep Spencer out of harm’s way and to allow him 
to speak.240 As University of Florida President Kent Fuchs noted, there 
were “nearly 1,000 state and local law-enforcement officers on campus” 
when Spencer spoke,241 which cost the University more than $600,000.242  
Second, the heckler’s veto doctrine allows Richard Spencer to 
successfully espouse more of his views because the police presence 
necessary to protect him from a hostile crowd also reduces the likelihood 
of violence that Brandenburg requires for speech to be cut off. In other 
words, Spencer is less likely to incite his own followers to commit 
imminent violence because they know—by witnessing a sizable police 
turnout—they are more likely to be arrested than in the absence of such a 
turnout. 
The police officers who must be present at Spencer’s campus speeches 
due to the heckler’s veto doctrine thus prevent violence by both protestors 
and supporters. The irony is that, were it not for the heckler’s veto doctrine 
and the ratcheted-up security it requires to safeguard Spencer, his speech 
could more easily be censored under Brandenburg. That’s because—at 
least in theory—the less intense the police presence, the more likely it is 
for violence to occur. In turn, the more likely it is for violence to occur, the 
more likely the speech in question will be stopped under Brandenburg. 
Imagine, for example, that Spencer were to give the exact same speech 
using the exact same words at two different campuses in front of the exact 
same number of protestors. At Campus A, there are 200 police officers on 
the scene. At Campus B, however, there are only five officers present.  
The theory posed here is that the presence of 200 officers reduces the 
likelihood of Spencer inciting violence on Campus A more than the 
presence of only five officers on Campus B. This reduction in likelihood of 
violence on Campus A, in turn, also reduces the ability of those officers to 
stop Spencer from speaking under Brandenburg. In brief, the government-
funded security mandated by the heckler’s veto doctrine not only serves 
the intended purpose of preventing protestors from attacking Spencer, but 
also effects the unintended consequence of allowing Spencer to get away 
with more hateful, race-baiting speech under Brandenburg by reducing the 
likelihood of violence. 
In summary, the battles now being fought between Richard Spencer’s 
supporters and public universities highlight issues surrounding 
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Brandenburg’s relationship to the doctrines against both prior restraints 
and hecklers’ vetoes. 
CONCLUSION 
The Brandenburg incitement test, as Professor Mark Strasser observes, 
“is thought by many to represent an extremely speech protective 
doctrine.”243 Indeed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit recently noted that “[i]t is not an easy task to find that speech rises 
to such a dangerous level that it can be deemed incitement to riot.”244 This 
Article, however, illustrates that it is also not an easy task to apply the 
Brandenburg standard. Specifically, there are multiple problems with 
Brandenburg’s application, as illustrated by analysis of In re Trump and 
the Richard Spencer lawsuits.  
In re Trump demonstrates the difficulty with proving Brandenburg’s 
intent requirement when a speaker both denies an intent to incite violence 
and when the speaker’s words do not directly reference violence. This 
Article has proposed multiple ways of using circumstantial evidence to 
address this problem. 
Additionally, In re Trump highlights problems regarding the extent to 
which past acts of violence at a speaker’s events should influence 
Brandenburg’s likelihood analysis. This Article has proposed three 
variables besides the raw number of acts of prior violence—namely a 
ratio-based factor, a temporal-distance factor, and a law enforcement 
presence factor— for courts to consider on the likelihood issue. These 
variables should add rigor to judicial review of Brandenburg’s likelihood 
requirement.  
The Richard Spencer lawsuits raise the issue of whether Brandenburg 
can be used as a prior restraint mechanism by government entities, with 
public universities as a leading example, to halt a speaker before he even 
begins his speech. Brandenburg is merely a cutoff mechanism, not one for 
making preemptive strikes that ban a speaker from appearing on campus. 
Additionally, the Spencer cases illustrate the complex relationship 
between the heckler’s veto doctrine and Brandenburg’s incitement test. 
Ultimately, the heckler’s veto doctrine has the unintended consequence of 
letting individuals like Richard Spencer safely deliver more of their 
ideological speech under Brandenburg. 
As Brandenburg approaches its fiftieth anniversary in 2019, it begs for 
judicial clarification on the application of all three of its prongs—intent, 
imminence, and likelihood—and its relationship to both prior restraints and 
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the heckler’s veto doctrine. Clarence Brandenburg, Donald Trump, and 
Richard Spencer all—in their own provocative ways—have pushed the 
envelope of First Amendment protection for speech to its breaking point.  
 
